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THE FUTURE OF HUmAN RIGHTS
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
Professor Nanda is far too well known in academic circles for me to
add anything new or different about his scholarship and contributions
to legal education and to international law and human rights. What I
can add, however, is my personal tribute to him as a person of integrity
and moral character. We have been friends since 1965, and over the
years, we have worked together on a number of academic projects,
including the first two volumes on international criminal law ever
published in the United States in 1973. Subsequently, we also co-edited
another volume on specific crimes arising under international criminal
law. During these years, we remained bound by an abiding friendship
arising out of mutual respect and affection, and it is my privilege to
contribute this manuscript to a volume of the Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy, which he founded and which is dedicated
to him. The thoughts that follow are in keeping with his concerns about
human rights.
THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS WE HAVE COME To KNOW IT
The aftermath of World War II brought about a paradigm shift in
positive international law with respect to the individual's relationship
to the state. The latter ceased to be considered as an object of
international law and became a subject thereof. This meant that the
individual could not only be the recipient of certain rights but also their
rightful claimant from states.
Experts have debated the moral, philosophical, ideological, and
historic origins of human rights.' Legal historians have found the very
concept to be part of legal systems going back five thousand yearS2
* Distinguished Research Professor of Law Emeritus; President Emeritus, International
Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University; President, International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Italy; and Honorary President,
International Association of Penal Law, Paris, France.
1. See, e.g., MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT
TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 2-14 (2004).
2. 1-2 JEAN IMBERT ET. AL., HISTOIRES DES INSTITUTIONS ET DES FAITS SOCIAUX
(1956); 1-3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF WORLD LEGAL SYSTEMS (Wm. M. Gaunt
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while theologians have found the rights of human beings posited in
almost every religion, particularly the Abrahamic faiths, Hinduism and
Buddhism. 3 But it was the European Age of Enlightenment that
established the philosophical foundations for the nineteenth century
liberalism4 that in turn developed the conceptual framework of the post
WWII International Human Rights Law regime.5
Postmodernism denies the proposition that there is a master
historical account that would help us understand how human rights
have come to be and how they have evolved, while on a parallel track,
contemporary multiculturalism places every group in a victim category.
But, when everybody is a victim and there is no historical framework,
how can there be a human rights system other than a chaotic
environment where anything and everything goes and where ultimately
power prevails? Paradoxically these postmodernism and
multiculturalism postulates acknowledge human rights values as
primary factors in historical and socio-political transitional phases such
as post-colonialism. From post WWII to the era of globalization, no
matter what method is used, various stages of history reveal a process
of historic thought accretion whose transmission substantiates, within
and among civilizations, a theory of historic evolution that leads to the
conceptual framework of post WWII human rights articulations.
Thereafter, the legal methods of international law were used for the
actualization of human rights values and their transference to legally
enforceable norms and standards. In turn, this post WWII actualization
of human rights is being tested in the transitional phase of
globalization by emerging systems, processes, structures, actors,
resources, and changing dynamics in the interrelations of states,
private sector entities, and individuals and groups. How and when the
present transitional phase ends is difficult to identify, but when it does,
human rights as we have known it since the end of WWII is likely to
take on a new shape. This applies to all three complementary legal
regimes, described below, whose "value-oriented goals" 6 encompass
human rights.
& Sons, 1992) (1928); PIERRE-CLEMENT TIMBAL & ANDRE CASTALDO, HISTOIRE DES
INSTITUTIONS PUBLIQUES ET DES FAITS SOCIAUX 13 (11th ed. 2004); RENE DAVID & JOHN
E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (2d ed. 1978).
3. DAVID S. Noss & BLAKE R. GRANGAARD, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS
(13th ed. 2011).
4. WILLIAM M. SPELLMAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 109
(2011).
5. ISHAY, supra note 1.
6. The late professor McDougal and his Yale colleagues are credited with having
developed in the 1960s a new framework and methodology for understanding
international law. This "New Haven" school, as it became known, employed its own
terminology, which includes the term used above. Professor Nanda was an early student
of the New Haven school. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW
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If history teaches us anything, it is that certain fundamental values
will survive no matter what historic exigencies may dictate. History
does not evolve in cycles but in repetitions triggered by the occurrence
of certain human experiences. It may simply be the case that when it
comes to human affairs, history records variations on the same themes.
How different societies under different circumstances adapt to new or
newly perceived realities is like the flow of a river, which in some places
runs deep and slow, and in others shallow and fast. At times the river of
human history also runs stagnant and even likely runs dry until new
confluents energize its flow. The course of the human river, however,
keeps going on and maybe, just as it started out in its evolutionary
course, it will proceed into its conclusionary one. 7
What this transitional phase of globalization means to the general
scheme of history is beyond prediction. But that it will affect human
rights as we have understood them since WWII seems rather certain.
2. THE THREE COMPLEMENTARY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES
ENCOMPASSING HUMAN RIGHTS
Since WWII, three different international legal regimes have co-
existed whose "value-oriented goals" include the protection of human
rights.8 They are: International Humanitarian Law ("IHL"),
International Criminal Law ("ICL") and International Human Rights
Law ("IHRL"). These regimes are, at once, complementary and distinct
as to, inter alia, their respective spheres of application, subjects,
contexts, and normative schemes. These differences, which characterize
these regimes whose historical origins are also different, necessarily
evidence overlap and gaps in the overall protective scheme of human
rights. This would have been avoided had all three been part of an
integrated legal regime, which is not the case. But what is significant is
that all three international legal regimes recognize: (1) the individual
as a subject of internationally established rights and obligations arising
directly under international law, (2) these rights and obligations
override national law, (3) that they are binding upon states, and (4) that
AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION (1961); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASWELL, & LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
7. See generally HENDRICK WILLEM VAN LOON, UPDATED BY JOHN MERRIMAN, THE
STORY OF MANKIND (1999); THEODORE ZELDIN, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF HUMANITY
(1994).
8. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 6; MCDOUGAL, LASWELL, & CHEN, supra
note 6.
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they require (in different and varying ways) international and domestic
enforcement measures, sanctions, and ultimately remedies for victims. 9
The recognition of the individual as a subject of international law
protected by legal rights limits the powers of the state. It is the other
side of the coin that provides for the individual's international criminal
responsibility.10 This was first embodied in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal ("IMT")'l and the Statute of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE"),12 both of
which relied on the customary international law of armed conflicts to
carry out individual international criminal responsibility based on what
was known as war crimes. 13 The Charter and Statute added to the core
"war crimes" charge, those of "crimes against humanity"14 and "crimes
against peace,"'" both of which criminalized conduct that violated the
right to life and to physical integrity. Shortly after the IMT and IMTFE
concluded their proceedings, the United Nations adopted the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.16 Since then, aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes became the four core crimes of International Criminal
9. The latter is of more recent vintage. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law G.A. Res.
60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/146 (Dec. 16, 2005); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 Hum. RTS. L. REV. 203 (2006); Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; International
Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, Rule
85 (2000).
10. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Discipline of International Criminal Law, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 21 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3rd ed. 2008); see M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 64 -71 (2003).
11. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis art. 1 (Aug. 8, 1945) 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
12. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (entered into force Apr. 26, 1946).
13. For the failed post-WWI efforts to establish international criminal responsibility,
as was subsequently the case after WWII, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I "The
War to End All Wars" and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice
System, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 244 (2002).
14. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 95 (2011).
15. See WHITNEY HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR
CRIMINALS AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, 1945-1946 (1999).
See also Yoram Dinstein, The Distinctions Between War Crimes and Crimes Against
Peace, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds.
1996).
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2d ed. 2009).
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Law ("ICL").17 ICL and International Humanitarian Law ("IHL") paved
the way for the paradigm shift mentioned above that was indispensable
for the establishment of the IHRL regime.
What all three international legal regimes have in common is the
protection of certain individual human rights from violations committed
by states. Some of these rights extend to collective rights, but they too
are posited in the nature of a relationship between a given collectivity
and a given state.
The International Human Rights Law Regime (IHRL)
International Human Rights Law applies to states. The first,
second, and third generations of human rights under IHRL are not
absolute rights that can be claimed by the protected person or persons
against other individuals or organizations whether they be IGOs,
NGOs, or business legal entities (with some exceptions).1 8 Conceptually,
the new post WWII paradigm of the individual being the subject of
internationally established rights and obligations is only in relationship
to a state and even in that respect there are some limitations as to
which state that may be. Individual rights are usually limited in their
application to the state of nationality or the state of residence with
some exceptions for certain human rights violations which are not
limited to these two categories of states such as migrant and refugee
rights,19 racial discrimination, 2 0 and the right to be free from cruel,
unusual, and degrading treatment or punishment under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") Article
1521 and the CAT.22
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human RightS23 and the two
1966 Covenants on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")24 and Economic
17. Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, supra note 9, arts. 5 - 8.
18. Contra ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
(2006). The author postulates the proposition that human rights protect the individual
from any source of harm. The author is ahead of his time, but that is maybe where
globalization is heading. This writer is more skeptical though sympathetic to Chapham's
desideratum.
19. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
20. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into
force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD].
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 and 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; art. 41 entered into
force Mar. 28, 1979) [hereinafter ICCPR].
22. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987)
[hereinafter CAT].
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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and Social RightS2 5 formed the core of what scholars refer to as the
"International Bill of Human Rights." 2 6 While the Universal
Declaration27 was at first deemed declaratory, it subsequently became
part of customary international law. 28 The two covenants originated as
binding positive international law, though prescriptive in nature. They
prescribed that certain individual rights were protected from state
infringement, but they did not provide for enforceable remedies even
though, in time, many of these individual rights were recognized as
constituting part of customary international law and thus presumably
binding upon non-state parties.
The declarative and prescriptive stages of IHRL were followed by
two subsequent stages, the specialization stage of normative
prescriptions and the proscriptive stage (described below under
"ICL").29 The first was characterized by a number of international
conventions whose subject matter and normative prescriptions
addressed, with varying degrees of specificity, some of the rights that
were enunciated in more general terms in the ICCPR. They include
women's rights,30 children's rights,3' racial equality, 32 migrants'
rights,33 rights of the disabled, 34 and other subject matters of human
rights protections. 35 This new stage of normative prescriptive rights
provided specificity to different subject matters and offered the promise
24. ICCPR, supra note 21.
25. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
26. John P. Humphrey, The International Bill of Human Rights: Scope and
Implementation, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 528-34 (1976).
27. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1, 45-49 (1975). See also PETER MALANCZUR, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 39-48 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
28. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW, 42 (1989).
29. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law
in the Processes of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD.
193 (1982).
30. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
31. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in armed conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S 222; Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2,
1990).
32. See ICERD, supra note 20.
33. See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force July 1, 2003).
34. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
35. See Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, ST/HR/1/Rev.6,
U.N. Sales No. E.02.XIV.4 (2002).
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of enforcement through the established treaty-bodies. 36 The treaty-
bodies were designed as implementation mechanisms for each of these
covenants and conventions; they were intended to enhance compliance
and reduce violations of the human rights protections guaranteed by
these international instruments. But these objectives were hardly
achieved. 37 Treaty mechanisms were never assessed in terms of their
effect on enhancing compliance and reducing violations.38 In fact, these
mechanisms have proven to be nothing more than procedural devices
that limit the consequences of a state party's violation to the mere
issuance of periodic reports by the respective treaty-body. 39 Considering
that most of these treaty-bodies are staffed by government officials and
former government officials, it is no wonder why so many of these
treaty bodies have done so little to induce state parties' compliance and
thus reduce violations.
The declarative and prescriptive stages of IHRL brought about a
large number of multilateral instruments, which in turn had an impact
on the contents and terminology of national constitutions, criminal
legislation, procedural norms, and evidentiary standards. 40 Thus, while
it is impossible to assess whether the adoption of these international
legal instruments have enhanced state compliance with what is now
commonly referred to as international human rights norms and
standards, it is nonetheless possible to assess their impact on national
normative developments. 41 Thus, the center of gravity of human rights
has, as it should, moved from internationalization to nationalization,
much as this writer believes that the future of international criminal
36. See NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY: WHAT FUTURE
FOR THE UN TREATY BODY SYSTEM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL PROCEDURES? (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & William A. Schabas eds., 2012) (listing the Committee on Elimination
of Racial Discrimination; the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the
Human Rights Committee; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women; the Committee against Torture; the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture; the
Committee on the Rights of the Child; the Committee on Migrant Workers; the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances).
37. Id.
38. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS MACHINERY, supra note 36, at xi - xxii.
39. None of them provides for independent fact finding as they are essentially
predicated on periodic reports by governments with are then reviewed by the respective
treaty bodies who issue periodic reports containing whatever findings and
recommendations these bodies elect to make.
40. BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 10, at
583-671.
41. Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: From Diversity to Rapprochment, 17
NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES (1998); The Regionalization of International Criminal Law
and the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 65 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF PENAL LAW (1994); Inquisitorial-Accusatorial: The collapse of dogmas in criminal
procedure, 68 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PENAL LAW (1997).
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justice and ICL and IHL as a whole are destined to follow this path. The
future of IHRL, ICL, and IHL is their absorption into national legal
systems whose enforcement mechanisms are likely to have a far more
effective impact on compliance than any assisting or prospective
international set of mechanisms.
The International Criminal Law Regime (ICL)
Following the normative prescriptive stage of IHRL described
above, another stage in the development of human rights protections
ensued through specialized conventions proscribing violations of certain
fundamental human rights as in the case of torture,42 slavery and
slave-related practice, 4 3  human trafficking, 4 4  and enforced
disappearances. 4 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment46 ("CAT") remains
the most striking example of the proscriptive stage of IHRL through
ICL. It criminalizes the commission of torture by any state party to the
said convention. Scholars have also concluded that the prohibition of
torture as reflected in CAT, the Universal Declaration,47 the ICCPR,48
and other regional instruments declaring the prohibition of torture49
amount to customary international law binding upon all states
42. See CAT, supra note 22; SIR NIGEL RODLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (3rd ed. 2009); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS
DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT (1988).
43. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227;
ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 8; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266
U.N.T.S. 3; Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 254; see also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Enslavement as an International Crime, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 445
(1991).
44. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319; Elizabeth Bruch,
Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1 (2004).
45. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A[RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
46. CAT, supra note 22.
47. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23.
48. ICCPR, supra note 21.
49. Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 8, May 22, 2004 (entered into force Mar. 15,
2008), reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Reps. 893 (2005); African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1986); American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(entered into force July 18, 1978); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953).
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irrespective of whether a given state is a state party to any of these
multilateral conventions.50
The proscription of other international human rights violations
reflect certain human values protected by IHRL as in the protection of
vulnerable groups such as civilians threatened by "terrorism."5 1 Fifteen
multilateral conventions and seven regional conventions address
different manifestations of "terrorism."5 2 The proscription of certain
50. See RODLEY & POLLARD, supra note 42.
51. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937 - 2001)
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Terrorism": Reflections on
Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, in VALUES AND VIOLENCE: INTANGIBLE ACTS OF
TERRORISM 233 (Ibrahim A. Karawan, Wayne McCormack & Stephen E. Reynolds eds.,
2008); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Assessing "Terrorism" into the New Millennium, 12 DEPAUL
BUS. L. J. 1 (2000); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A
Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 83 (2002).
52. Multilateral Conventions: 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Sept. 10, 2010 (not yet
in force), DCAS Doc No. 22; see also 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Relating to International Civil Aviation, adopted Sept. 10, 2010 (not yet in force), DCAS
Doc. No. 21; Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, adopted Nov. 1, 2005,
LEG/CONF.15/22; Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted Oct. 14, 2005, LEG/CONF.15/22
(entered into force July 28, 2010); International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002);
Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, Working Document
Submitted by India, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1 (Aug. 28, 2000); International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 (entered into
force May 23, 2001); Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363 (entered into force Jan. 15, 1999); Convention
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 2122
U.N.T.S. 359; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
Mar. 10, 1998, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627;
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125; International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force June 3, 1983);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167
(entered into force Feb. 20, 1977); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention
on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704
U.N.T.S. 219; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into
force Sept. 30, 1962).
Regional Conventions: Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on
Combating International Terrorism, July 1, 1999, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/publisher,OIC,,,3de5e6646,0.html (deposited with the General Secretariat of the
30 VOL. 40:1-3
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acts of terror-violence are not only deemed harmful to the state and to
international peace and security, but it also constitutes violations of
different individual human rights such as the right to life, physical
integrity, personal safety and security, and the enjoyment of
international means of travel.
States' efforts at controlling "terrorism" have in turn produced
human rights violations when they resulted in the curtailment of
certain human rights for those deemed as "terrorists" by states. This is
evident in the commission of torture at the Guantanamo facility (Cuba)
established by the United States, the commission of torture in Iraq
(notably at Abu Ghraib prison) and Afghanistan (notably at Bagram Air
Force Base), and extrajudicial executions and torture in the context of
what the United States has euphemistically referred to as
"extraordinary rendition." 53
Organization of the Islamic Conference); OAU Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism, June 14, 1999, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3f4b1f714.html (deposited with the Secretary General of the Organization
of African Unity); Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, June 4, 1999, available at
http://www.unher.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb290.html (deposited with the Executive
Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States); Arab Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/publisher,LAS,,,3de5e4984,0.html (deposited with the Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States); SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Nov.
4, 1987, available at http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr-ctd/cbrctd_36.html
(deposited with the Secretary-General of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/090.htm (deposited with
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe); Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts
of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are
of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/treaties/a-49.html (deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of
American States).
53. See, e.g., Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in
Europe 1998-2008, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 952-53, 965-66 (2009); Jordan J. Paust, Above
the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret
Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345,
345-73 (2007); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 824-51 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Ending the U.S. Program of Torture
and Impunity: President Obama's First Steps and the Path Forward, 19 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 151, 151 n.1 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 359-61 & n.1 (2009); see Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary
Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1200 (2007); Michael P. Scharf, Keynote Address: The T-Team, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L.
129, 130-31, 134-35 (2010); symposium, Philip Zelikow, Codes of Conduct for a Twilight
War, David Cole, The Taint of Torture: The Roles of Law and Policy in Deciding Whether
to Torture or Execute a Human Being, Mark Danner, The Twilight of Responsibility:
Torture and the Higher Deniability, 49 Hous. L. REV. (2012); Indefensible: A Reference for
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While ICL is a regime essentially geared to sanction what has come
to be regarded as international and transnational crimes, these crimes
are committed by individuals and groups in different contexts and for
different purposes. 54 Non-state actors include: (1) groups that pursue
ideological purposes by violent means and that are referred to as
"terrorists," (2) groups that seek to obtain profit by the use of violence
that are referred to as "organized crime" 55 groups and, (3) groups that
are parties in conflicts of a purely internal and non-international
character.56 These groups' activities overlap and frequently drift in and
out of these legal categories, which reveals the failure of international
legislative policy.
The "value-oriented goals"5 7 of these multiple sub-regimes of ICL
include not only human rights considerations but the preservation of
international peace and security and the security and public interests of
Prosecuting Torture and Other Felonies Committed by U.S. Officials Following September
11th, WORLD ORG. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS USA (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Int'l Human
Rights Law Clinic, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2012, at 3-19, 38-156; Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee, United States of America, U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
87th Sess., July 10-28, 2006, 10, 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18,
2006); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the
Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United
States of America, U.N. Committee Against Torture, 36th Sess., May 1-19, 2006, 14 (the
U.S. "should recognize and ensure that the Convention applies at all times, whether in
peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction...."), 1 15 ("provisions
of the Convention apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the effective
control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world."), T 19 (there
exists an "absolute prohibition of torture . . without any possible derogation."), 24 (the
U.S. "should rescind any interrogation technique, including methods involving sexual
humiliation, 'water boarding,' 'short shackling' and using dogs to induce fear, that
constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in all places
of detention under its de facto effective control, in order to comply with its obligations
under the Convention."), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006); Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly Res. 1433, Lawfulness of Detentions by the United States in
Guantanamo Bay, 1 7(i)-(vi), 8(i)-(iii) (vii)-(viii) (Apr. 26, 2005); U.N. Comm. on Human
Rights, Situation of the Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006) (by Leila Zerrougui et al.) [hereinafter U.N. Experts'
Report]; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High
Value Detainees" in CIA Custody (Feb. 2007), available at http://pegc.us/archivel
Organizations/ICRC rpt-hvd_20070214.pdf., quoted in Mark Danner, U.S. Torture: Voices
from the Black Sites, 56 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, ch. 1 (Apr. 9, 2009).
54. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15-25 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
55. TOM OBOKATA, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-19
(2010).
56. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Symposium: Redefining International Criminal Law: New
interpretations and New Solutions: Criminal Law: The New Wars and the Crisis of
Compliance With The Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 711, 713-14 (2008).
57. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 6, at 262-63, 302; MCDOUGAL, CHEN, &
LASWELL, supra note 6, at 3-6.
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states. The balancing of these interests necessarily affects the goals and
methods pursued by states, individually and collectively. That which at
one time can tip the scales in favor of human rights, can also tip them
in the direction when considerations of security are deemed to affect
those pertaining to human rights.
The International Humanitarian Law Regime (IHL)
Another international legal regime protecting human rights is
IHL. The four Geneva Conventions 8 of August 12, 1949 and the two
Additional Protocols of 197759 are the normative cornerstones of this
regime that also includes the customary law of armed conflict.60 The
IHL legal regime applies to the protection of certain persons, targets,
and means employed during the course of international and non-
international conflicts but does not extend to purely internal conflicts. 61
The protected scheme of IHL has been interpreted by states as having
greater application in the context of conflicts of an international
character than conflicts of a non-international character, even though
doctrine has equated the protective rights for non-combatants as well as
combatants in these two contexts. 62 The practice of states however has
not followed the writings of scholars in connection with the same
applicability of IHL protections in both contexts, but international
tribunals have. 63
IHL and IHRL overlap, as evidenced by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") decision in the Wall case involving Israel's treatment of
58. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
59. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
610.
60. 1 MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR 134-
39 (3rd ed. 2011); ICRC, Violence and the Use of Force, 8-10 (July 2011).
61. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 17-19 (1990).
62. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 554-55 (1995).
63. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT- 94-1-A,
Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 4, 1998).
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Palestinians and Palestinian occupied territories. 64 As evidenced in this
case, the ICJ held that the two regimes are simultaneously applicable
but that IHL, being the lex specialis, prevails over IHRL, which is the
lex generalis, thus there is a gap in the protection of human rights
during conflicts of purely internal nature. 65
IHRL and ICL also overlap in that ICL criminalizes some of the
conduct prohibited by IHRL, but in different contexts. An example of
the overlap between the two regimes is in connection with combatants
in conflicts of an international and non-international character who
engage in collateral activities proscribed by ICL as "organized crime"6 6
activities, "terrorism," 67 or drug trafficking. 68 It has not yet been
established by the ICJ or by experts how to address the overlay between
ICL and IHRL. 6 9
More importantly, conflicts can shift from primarily internal to
international and during this shift multiple legal regimes are
applicable. This overlap will occasionally bring about IHL's supremacy
over ICL and vice-versa.
3. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Although international criminal justice has made progress with the
establishment of such institutions as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 70 International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda,71 International Criminal Court, 72 and the mixed model
64. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 106 (July 9).
65. Id. 105-06.
66. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res.
55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383, art. 2(a) (Nov. 15, 2000).
67. Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra note
51, at xxv-xxix; Karawan, McCormack, & Reynolds, supra note 51, at 233-35.
68. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances art. 3, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95; Convention on
Psychotropic Substances art. 1, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175; Protocol Amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 1, Mar. 25, 1972, 976 U.N.T.S. 3; Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, As Amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 art. 1, Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151.
69. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 4-7 (2d ed. 2008); ILIAS
BANTEKAS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 19-20 (Hart Publishing, 4th ed. 2010);
ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 15-17 (2008).
70. S.C. Res. 827, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI
& PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 202-08 (1996); 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 37-48 (1995).
71. S.C. Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); See VIRGINIA MORRIS &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1-2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 37-46
(1998).
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tribunals, 73 the values of international criminal justice have not yet
become part of the goals of globalization. 74 The present stage of
globalization has emphasized economic and financial interests over
humanistic and humanitarian values and principles. Economic and
financial interests, whether in the public or private sectors, continue to
prevail over humanistic and humanitarian values. Contemporary
economic and financial crises in the world dominate the interests of
states to the detriment of their interest in human rights. Moreover,
concerns for internal security and stability have prevailed as states'
interests over the interests of humanitarian and humanistic values.
Efforts by the international community to advance the theory of
universal jurisdiction for certain international crimes, which are
designed to protect human rights and prevent genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, torture, and extrajudicial executions, have not
been successful.7 5 Universal jurisdiction remains a desideratum that
has been thwarted by the interest of states seeking to advance their
state interests. Realpolitik has once again prevailed over the lofty
humanistic and humanitarian values reflected in so many international
conventions and in the writings of scholars. 76 For maybe similar
reasons, states have resisted the proposition that human rights are
universal and should be universally enforced. The international
community is as reluctant to enforce ICL universally as it is to
universally enforce IHRL.
This is evident in the high number of general amnesties provided
by states after internal conflicts. The number of amnesties has reached
125 out of a total of 313 conflicts that occurred between 1945 and
72. See Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 1.
73. Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1757, art. 1 (May, 30 2007); Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art.
1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; GA Res 52/135, 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/135 (Feb.
27, 1998); S.C. Res. 1272, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (created the UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor); S.C. Res. 1244, 5, U.N. Doc. S[RES/1244
(Jun. 10, 1999) (created the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo);
BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 10, at 548-50.
74. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J.
INT'L L. 269, 276 (2010).
75. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 137 (2001); see L. REYDAMS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1-3
(2003); The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN
LAW AND PUB. AFFAIRS, 22-29 (2001), http://lapa.princeton.edulhosteddocs/univejur.pdf.
76. Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at 291;
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Challenges Facing a Rule-of-Law-Oriented World Order, 8 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 4 (2010); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Perennial Conflict between
International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 546-47 (2006).
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2008.77 Accountability for International Crimes is also an area that is
more talked about than carried out, as evidenced by the fact that in the
313 conflicts mentioned above-which resulted in the deaths of at least
92 million-only 727 international prosecutions took place.78
4. GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Globalization has created new spatial and political opportunities
for human rights to develop including speed and access to information
and social media, which increases the individual's ability to galvanize
one another and generate massive popular movements. New horizons
are likely to include individual and political rights as well as collective
social, economic and cultural rights. New agents of change have,
however, emerged in this transitional phase which have the capability
of enhancing future human rights prospects. These agents include
international and national civil society and a sensitized private sector
economy, which can more directly impact human rights outcomes than
any other segment of the globalized society. For those whose interest is
to categorize the periods of evolution or development of IHRL, the new
horizons of human rights in this globalized era will probably be
classified as the fourth generation of human rights.7 9 But this new
generation of human rights will be based on a number of paradigm
shifts whose outcomes cannot be predicted.
First, human rights claims by individuals and collectivities are no
longer going to be directed only towards states, for they too will be
impacted by the processes of globalization and the uncertainty about
what will make state structures and powers is uncertain. Moreover, as
the powers of states are diluted in the era of globalization, there exists
no specific globalized counterpart or authoritative process to replace the
state. Power and decision-making are likely to be more diffused in
globalized society than in a Westphalian state based system.80 At the
same time, states have lost a substantial part of their capacity to
govern. Thus, a tectonic shift is taking place with respect to states'
decision-making powers and effectiveness that will impact the states'
77. Christopher Mullins, Post-Conflict Justice 1945-2008, in THE PURSUIT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, vol. 1, at 80 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 2010).
78. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, vol. 1, 34
(2010) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at 280;
Jane E. Stromseth, Justice of the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen
Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies?, 1 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 87, 90
(2009).
79. See generally ISHAY, supra note 1, at 245-313.
80. See THOMAs ALFRED WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 147-48 (1899);
see generally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 20 (1948).
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capacity to carry out their obligations under the traditional terms of a
"social contract."81 Whether the shift towards globalized systems and
processes is likely to replace that which is being eroded is at least
speculative.
Globalization of the world's economy and financial systems and
methods of communication have also resulted in new ways to infringe
on individual human rights. This includes predatory economic and
financial practices by multinational corporations, control of the right of
access to information, intrusions on privacy, and threats to the
environment. The transition phase of globalization is witnessing the
erosion of states' powers, in fact, because of the shift in decision-making
power to new globalized institutions and processes, and in part because
the increased ungovernability of contemporary societies. The reduced
capabilities of governments to protect, preserve, and enforce human
rights, in the absence of collective exercise of parallel power by the
international community in the present context of international
relations and the international law systems, have not been substituted
by anything new that globalization may eventually offer. This raises a
number of issues which include, whether there is something called the
global society that could be held accountable for the violation of human
rights in this transitional phase to globalization and whether
individuals will be able to make human rights' claims against the global
society and if so, in what manner and before what forum?
The first and second generations of human rights were tailored to
apply to states where national fora offered the prospects of adjudicating
a human rights violation and of obtaining a remedy. The third
generation of human rights has proven to be of little effect. The fourth
generation of human rights in this transitional phase to a globalized
society is not likely to offer better outcomes than its precedent one.
Although globalization mainly encompasses the multiplicity of
international processes and collective decision-making bodies consisting
mostly of states, the private sector has also developed informal
processes that are capable of producing outcomes that are similar to
those of structured state control decision making bodies. The impact of
these and other phenomena of globalization have not been the same
everywhere in the world or similar with respect to different categories
of rights. Thus, the expansion of a globalized free market economy that
seems to have had the most impact throughout the world, has not
necessarily witnessed a concomitant rise of labor rights though it has no
doubt energized the discourse on labor rights as human rights
throughout the world. The globalization of a free market economy,
which requires the free flow of goods and movement of materials across
81. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Dover
Publications 2003) (1762).
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national boundaries without hindrances, has extended to the free
movement of people across state boundaries but not necessarily to the
freedom of people to immigrate without discretionary restrictions
imposed by host countries, save for certain minimal rights of asylum. 82
Another unexplained perverse consequence is the regression of the
rights of immigrant labor forces and the hardship suffered by refugees
fleeing wars, repressive regimes, economic exploitation, and poverty.
Western societies, which are economically among the world's most
advanced, have been the more resistant to these and other human
rights claims deriving from globalization based on their interpretations
of cultural relativism and claims of nationalistic cultural rights.
Cultural differences continue to stand in the way of the universality of
human rights. Last but not least, globalization has not impacted the
bottom billion people of the world who live in poverty. 83
Globalization is not necessarily a recipe for a more harmonious
world or for one that is more likely to uphold human rights on a
universal and non-discriminatory basis. It is bringing about new
realities in the lives of individuals whose traditional family support
systems have disappeared or substantially eroded. The state, as has
been evident in the last 200 years or so, has not been able to provide a
substitute for these support systems other than by offering social
services devoid of the human element that is so important in the life of
persons. Can one expect a globalized society to do any better? Surely
international and national civil society, which will expand in the era of
82. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); see generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-24 (2005).
83. See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT,
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 100 (2011), available at http://wdr2011.worldbank.org
/sites/default/files/pdfsfWDR2011_FullText.pdf (discussing the correlation between
human rights and economic development. According to the 2011 World Development
Report, 1.5 billion people live in countries suffering from continual political and criminal
violence. This can only be overcome through strengthening of "legitimate national
institutions and governance" which provide the foundation for security, justice,
employment and, accordingly, the risk of violent conflict. In particular, more than 90
percent of civil wars since 2000 occurred in places that previous civil wars in the last
three decades. This sort of endemic violence seriously impacts the capacity of states to
develop and escape poverty. It is noteworthy that not a single "low-income fragile or
conflict affected[ed]" state has achieved one of the UN's Millennium Development Goals.
Poverty is, on average, 20 percent higher in those countries than in their conflict free
neighbors. One of the clear lessons is the need to build strong and effective governments
with a rule of law, as countries without the requisite governmental institutions are 30-45
percent more likely to see a civil war than those with such institutions. In sum,
unemployment, corruption, injustice, exclusion and the systemic violation of human
rights remain the strongest causes and predictors of violence). See generally PAUL
COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING & WHAT CAN
BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007) (discussing the correlation between economic development and
globalization).
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globalization, are not likely to provide a substitute for the traditional
(and now maybe historic) support systems of family community, tribe,
or village. But no one can anticipate the outcomes of realigning social
structures.84
CONCLUSION
Since WWII, human rights norms and standards have developed at
the international, regional, and national levels, though with varying
degree of effectiveness. Human rights instruments have influenced
national constitutions and permeated the legal systems of most states.
International criminal justice has also made inroads at the national
level, increasingly reaching heads of states who have committed human
rights violations. But even though the principle of accountability has
been widely recognized, its application is at least symbolic. 85
The economic crisis of 2008 and its consequences on world poverty
and the crisis of governability are eroding the ability of states to fulfill
their part of the traditional "social contract." As a result, states'
legitimacy is being undermined and peoples are turning to other ways
to protect human rights. What we have come to know as human rights
since WWII is increasingly conditioned by economic and socio-political
realities evidenced in state practices and in collective state actions and
inactions. One such example is the failure of the fledgling principle of
the Responsibility to Protect 86 to become part of an institutionalized
process of decision-making leading to consistent practice by the
international community. The failure of the international community to
intervene for the protection of peoples from genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes is reflected in the 313 conflicts that have
erupted in various national contexts since the end of WWII that
resulted in 92 million casualties.87 The conduct of states during these
conflicts reveals that they intervene mostly when their national
interests are at stake and not necessarily when the human rights of
peoples are subject to large scale depredations are at risk.
84. Francis Fukuyama, The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the
Decline of the Middle Class? 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 53, 59-61 (2012).
85. Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at 284.
86. See U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 138-39, U.N.
Doc. A/60!L.1 (Sept. 15, 2005); see generally GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY To
PROTECT: ENDING MASs ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 50-54 (2008); ALEX J.
BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT To END MASS ATROCITIES 1-
5 (2009). See also Jennifer Moore, R2P=MDGs, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
Through the Millennium Development Goals, in this book.
87. BASSIOUNI, THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 78, at
34.
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What is more likely to characterize the next phase?
1. The economic disparities between what is called developed,
developing states, and the less developed states for the some one billion
people of the world88 are increasing. The bottom billion is likely to
increase by 50 percent to 100 percent in the next 20 years (for
demographic and economic reasons) while the top billion will likely
suffer from the economic crisis that erupted in 2008. Many will fall
below the poverty level and the so-called middle class will struggle more
to preserve its hitherto economic privileges. States will increasingly be
unable to provide the economic and social services they historically
offered or promised. Their part of the "social contract" will be
increasingly unfulfilled, and the states' legitimacy will be undermined.
The globalized system will not be a substitute for state's social and
economic responsibilities. Individual human rights will shift from social
and political rights reflecting the ideas of liberal democracy to basic
needs rights deriving from economic necessities. Distribution of wealth,
resources and allocation of public services will become a priority over
what will seem as the luxury of individual social and political rights in
the exercise of democratic freedoms.
2. The legitimacy of state powers will no longer derive from the
protection of liberal democratic freedoms and their exercise by as many
individuals as the state may help accede thereto. Rather, state powers
will derive from insuring human survivability and public safety. In the
process of this focus shift, individual and collective social and political
rights will be eroded while emphasis will shift to the exigencies of
survivability. This focus shift will be driven by increased difficulties and
costs of governments, which has been referred to herein as the
governability crisis that seems to have permeated so many governments
whether they be in developed, developing, or less developed states. But
new factors will emerge at the global level in such dimensions that
states' capabilities to confront them will be significantly challenged.
This includes famine and natural disasters such as floods, tsunamis,
earthquakes, and other consequences of climate change, and industrial
disasters whether related thereto or such nuclear ones. In the last few
years alone, the world has witnessed a number of these tragic
situations in Africa and Asia, evidencing the inability of states to
prevent and to effectively respond. 89 As the effects of climate change
increase while the global community stands hopelessly unable to
88. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 83, at 1-2.
89. See, e.g., Somalia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/countriesandterritories/somalia/index.html?sp=10&sq=disasters% 2in%20
africa&st=cse; see, e.g., In-depth: When disaster strikes: the response to the South Asia
Earthquake, IRIN (June 5, 2006), http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthld
=6&ReportId=34369.
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prevent further deterioration, the impact on the basic human rights to
life and safety will increase. The priority of protecting individual
human rights will fall in consideration of these new threats.
3. The economic and social factors described above have already
resulted in more than 40 failed and failing states out of a total of 194
states. 90 It is within these states that internal conflicts usually arise
necessitating external intervention at enormous costs that other states
and the international community are increasingly finding beyond their
means. Failed and failing states also impact the stability and economy
of neighboring states, thus increasing the range of their negative
situations beyond their borders. But it is the enormity of the human
harm produced by these states that challenges every conception of
human rights. 91 Will globalization provide for a better solution or will it
be an escape hatch for states to resume the status quo of looking the
other way irrespective of the harmful human rights outcomes likely to
result?
4. The contemporary tension between human rights and security is
reminiscent of the historical tensions between states' exercise of power
from time immemorial up to the nineteenth century and the rights of
individuals recognized since WWII. No one today argues that states,
because they are states, have the right to arbitrarily kill a person or to
engage in torture. Instead the contemporary argument is that even
though the right to life and physical integrity is recognized, there are
exceptions justified by security needs. The United States makes this
argument in connection with its usage of drones to attack individuals
who are deemed (by a small segment of persons in government, namely
military and intelligence establishments) to pose a threat to the
security of the United States. 92 In the same vein, "extraordinary
rendition" and torture in Guantanamo, Cuba, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram
have been used by U.S. military and intelligence personnel as well as
private contractors. 93 At no time did the Bush Administration, which
engaged in this practice, argue that torture was not illegal. What was
argued was that these acts either did not constitute torture or were
90. The Failed States Index 2011, FOREIGN POLICY, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/06/1 7/2011_failed states indexinteractive-map-and.rankings (last visited
Feb. 10, 2012).
91. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 83, at 3-4.
92. Scott Shane, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sunday-review/coming-soon-the-drone-armsracehtml?
pagewanted=all.
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justified for national security reasons. 94 Seldom is the argument of
human rights, let alone of the rule of law, given much acknowledgement
in political and even legal circles.
The security argument is a de facto displacement of the
applicability of human rights. In other words, it is a theory of
exceptionalism that is gaining public recognition primarily in the
United States and in some Western European countries who now join
the list of states that have consistently resorted to such exceptionalism
as a way of safeguarding their national political interests. The U.S.'s
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan are two such examples, as is NATO's
bombing of Libya. All three had one thing in common, regime change,
and few raised concerns over the human rights violations caused by
these armed attacks.
5. The outlines of a new historical phase for human rights are
already identifiable. It will include a new paradigm shift from the
protection of individual human rights vis & vis states to the
predominance of state interests over those of individuals as was the
case before WWII. This paradigm shift will emphasize individual
responsibilities and the primacy of collective security interests within
and between states over the post WWII approach, which emphasized
the predominance of certain fundamental individual human rights over
state interests. But the decline of human rights in the context of
relations between the state and the individual will be counterbalanced
by the strengthening of collective rights vis a vis states and the
international community. 9
6. A number of indicators point to the erosion of human rights as
we came to know them since the end of WWII. What will replace it is
difficult to foresee except in one respect. The concept of human rights as
the embodiment of human dignity has become both the ethos and the
pathos of so many in our seven billion world population. The fact that
states and the global society may be unable to deliver their sides of the
new social contract will not affect the demand side for human rights.
And the demand in keeping with the market laws of free enterprise
capitalism, which is an integral part of globalization, will play its part
in preserving the supply side, namely states and the institution and
processes of the globalized society. What these new processes will be,
and how they are likely to produce positive human rights outcomes is of
course difficult to predict. But to paraphrase Mark Twain, news about
the complete demise of human rights is premature. But news about its
transformation is reasonably certain. Whether the new human rights
94. Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/washington
/04interrogate.html.
95. COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS 380 (2000).
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outcomes will make a positive contribution to peoples' lives in the new
era of globalized society and with respect to what sectors of that society
is something crystal ball gazers in our field have yet to discern. But for
sure, the new globalized society will face daunting global problems that
will take priority over individual human rights if, in the trade-off, the
human rights of the masses are better protected, the balance sheet will
be acceptable. Considering, however, the dimensions of the problems
that the global society faces and will face in light of states' willingness
to collectively address what is in the offing, the prospects are not too
positive.
